Ahead of the 2027 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election, new rifts and rival factions have emerged within the opposition alliance. Rather than focusing on preventing the ruling BJP from returning to power for a third term, the opposition is locked in intense competition over leadership, seat-sharing, and retaining Dalit-Muslim vote banks.
At the peak of this, Asaduddin Owaisi's All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) and Nagina Lok Sabha MP Chandrashekhar Azad's Azad Samaj Party (Kanshi Ram) have jointly announced a new alliance called the 'Samajik Parivartan Morcha' (Social Change Front) in Lucknow.

Owaisi’s long-standing demand and the snub
Owaisi’s long-standing demand has been for a place in the anti-BJP 'India' alliance in Uttar Pradesh. After the snub in Bihar and several attempts at reconciliation, he issued this warning four months ago:
"I have said before, and I say it again now, that the Majlis party does not want the BJP to return to power in Uttar Pradesh. I am ready to join hands. I am ready to form an alliance. This is the time to talk. Don’t cry after the election is over. We do not want the BJP to return to power."
However, the Samajwadi Party and the Congress, who have not yet finalized seat-sharing among themselves, did not heed his request. AIMIM’s Uttar Pradesh president, Shaukat Ali, has said that Owaisi’s side joined hands with Chandrashekhar Azad after efforts to form an alliance with the Samajwadi Party, Congress, and Bahujan Samaj Party failed to yield results.
Announcement of the New Alliance
At a joint press conference held in Lucknow last Thursday, Owaisi announced that they would build a strong alternative political force in the state to stop the BJP. He also stated emphatically, "If we have to die for the welfare of the people, that is a good deal for us; Akhilesh Yadav will not become chief minister."
For the 2027 assembly election, Chandrashekhar Azad has been announced as the chief ministerial candidate. This new alliance plans to contest all 403 constituencies in the state.
They say their main aim is to bring Dalits, Muslims, and backward communities together under a common political platform.
The Muslim-Dalit communities at the center of the new alliance together make up about 40% of the state’s voters. But population numbers do not automatically translate into votes. The Uttar Pradesh electoral arena is already crowded with the BJP, the Samajwadi Party, the Bahujan Samaj Party, Congress, and smaller caste-based parties in the National Democratic Alliance. In this context, the question is how much impact this alliance will have.

This effort to bring Dalit-Muslim votes under one umbrella poses a major challenge to the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party, which have traditionally relied on the votes of these two communities. There is no doubt that if those votes are split, it will greatly benefit the BJP.
Ahead of the 2025 Bihar Assembly election, Owaisi offered to contest just six seats in the 'India' alliance led by the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). The RJD-Congress alliance rejected it.
In the 2020 election, AIMIM proved its strength by winning 5 seats in the Seemanchal region. (What happened later, when four of those five MLAs defected to the RJD, is another story.) In 2025, AIMIM, contesting on its own, once again won those same 5 constituencies and retained its vote bank. This dealt a major setback to the RJD alliance.
A similar neglect has now occurred in Uttar Pradesh as well. Despite Owaisi repeatedly expressing his desire to form an alliance with Akhilesh Yadav, the Samajwadi Party paid no heed. The result is this new front.
A direct challenge to the Samajwadi Party
The party that should be immediately concerned about this alliance is the Samajwadi Party led by Akhilesh. The Owaisi-Azad alliance has emerged as a direct challenge to the party’s PDA (Pichda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak - backward classes, Dalits, minorities) social arithmetic.
The Muslim vote bank could become a major weakness for the Samajwadi Party. Muslim voters, who make up about 19%, have largely voted for the Samajwadi Party in past elections as the main party opposing the BJP.
In 143 assembly constituencies in the state, Muslim votes are a decisive force in determining victory.

"Why don’t you provide proper political representation to the Muslims who vote for you?" Owaisi has been repeatedly asking. The alliance with Azad further strengthens this argument. It helps them present themselves not merely as a party that splits Muslim votes, but as a broader coalition of Dalit-Muslim communities.
Pressure on the Bahujan Samaj Party
If Owaisi targets the Samajwadi Party’s Muslim vote bank, Azad’s moves will create significant pressure on the Bahujan Samaj Party and Mayawati.
Although Dalits make up 21% of the state’s population, they are not a single political bloc. The Bahujan Samaj’s traditional vote bank has been the Jatav community. Among non-Jatav Dalits, the BJP is gradually increasing its influence.

Asad’s rise as a young Dalit leader poses a new challenge for Mayawati. His victory in Nagina in the 2024 Lok Sabha election has established Asad not just as a Dalit rights activist, but as an electoral force.
The Congress’s position
The alliance has also created problems for the Congress, which is trying to regain a foothold in the state by forming an alliance with the Samajwadi Party. Congress’s efforts to attract Dalits and minorities directly clash with the goals of the Owaisi-Azad alliance.
Advantage: If Owaisi splits the Muslim votes and Azad the Dalit votes, the anti-BJP vote will be fragmented. In the 2022 विधानसभा election, the BJP won 255 seats with 41.29% of the vote. The Samajwadi Party secured 111 seats with 32.06% of the vote. If the votes are split, the BJP has a chance to win easily.
However, this new front could pose a challenge to the social coalition the BJP has built by bringing together non-Yadav OBCs and non-Jatav Dalit communities.
That said, if it weakens the main opposition party, the Samajwadi Party, it could ultimately end up being a major advantage for the BJP itself.

In the 2024 Lok Sabha election, the Samajwadi Party and Congress, contesting as part of the 'India' alliance, dealt a major shock to the BJP by winning 43 of the total 80 seats (Samajwadi 37, Congress 6). However, open differences have now emerged between the two parties over seat-sharing for the 2027 assembly election.
Congress side: Rajendra Pal Gautam, the Uttar Pradesh Congress in-charge, has said that a preliminary list has been submitted to the Samajwadi Party, asking for 175 to 200 constituencies to be allotted. His argument is, "Based on the Lok Sabha election victory and the party's organizational strength, we have the right to ask for constituencies where we have a chance of winning." With Congress currently having only 2 MLAs in the Assembly, the party is keen to convert its Lok Sabha success into Assembly seats.
Samajwadi side: Akhilesh is not ready to give up more seats based solely on the Lok Sabha election results. It is conducting confidential surveys on Congress’s current ground situation and vote bank in constituencies including Rae Bareli and Amethi, which are considered strongholds of the Nehru-Gandhi family.
Both parties are set to form separate committees to carry forward the talks.
Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party is determined to contest all 403 seats independently without joining any alliance. On November 5, Mayawati, who held consultations with the state’s 75 district heads and senior leaders, has instructed them to strengthen the party at the polling-booth level and select eligible candidates.
The BSP, which won just 1 seat and secured 12.88% of the vote in the 2022 Assembly election, failed to win even a single seat in the 2024 Lok Sabha election. Nevertheless, with its grassroots structure spread across the state and its traditional Dalit vote base, the BSP continues to remain a force capable of determining the opposition’s chances of victory in many constituencies.

The challenge before the opposition parties
In this election, which is being seen as a precursor to the 2029 parliamentary election, the opposition parties’ differences have brought some relief to the BJP. If they want to disturb the BJP’s sleep, the opposition parties must do several things:
The Samajwadi Party and the Congress must smoothly complete seat-sharing without weakening their own strength.
BSP, AIMIM, and the Azad Samaj Party are trying to create separate political bases among the Dalit and Muslim communities. Akhilesh Yadav must take the lead in thwarting that.
The Lok Sabha election centered on national issues. But in the Assembly election, with 403 constituencies, local leadership, candidate selection, and vote transfer among alliance partners will determine victory.
Before defeating the BJP, the biggest challenge for the opposition parties is to prevent their core vote banks from splintering because of the power struggle among themselves. The coming months will determine whether Owaisi and Azad can turn their Dalit-Muslim arithmetic into a strong electoral force, and whether the 'Samajik Parivartan Morcha' can grow to the point of challenging established parties.
What does Prashant Jha’s “How the BJP Wins” (in Tamil: "பாஜக எப்படி வெல்கிறது?") say?
In senior journalist Prashant Jha’s book How the BJP Wins: Inside India’s Greatest Election Machine, it is carefully recorded how Dalit and Other Backward Class (OBC) votes have been the decisive force behind the BJP’s rise and fall in Uttar Pradesh politics.
Amit Shah and Sunil Bansal realized that the BJP, traditionally seen only as a “Brahmin-Bania (trader)” party, would have to broaden its social base if it wanted to capture power in Uttar Pradesh.
1. Vote-bank arithmetic (the 55–60% formula)
Amit Shah’s team analyzed Uttar Pradesh’s social structure with precision:
Muslims (20%): Will not vote for the BJP.
Yadavs (10%): Will remain loyal to the Samajwadi Party.
Jatav Dalits (11–12%): Will remain loyal to Mayawati’s BSP.
After excluding these, the BJP found that the remaining 55% to 60% of voters are the ones who decide victory. This includes the forward castes, as well as non-Jatav Dalits and non-Yadav Other Backward Classes who have not come to power.

2. How Dalit votes were split (Jatav vs non-Jatav)
During Mayawati’s rule, there was a perception that within the Dalit community, the “Jatav” section had received the most political power and government jobs. The BJP turned this to its advantage:
Attracting other Dalit groups: It targeted non-Jatav Dalit castes such as Valmiki, Pasi, Kori, Dhobi, and Khatik, and capitalized on their dissatisfaction with Mayawati.
Representation for local leaders: It reserved a significant number of party positions and election tickets for local leaders from smaller Dalit and backward communities.
3. Uniting Dalits under the Hindutva umbrella
Adopting Ambedkar: The BJP and the RSS began celebrating Ambedkar. Upgrading five sites associated with him as the “Panch Teerth” and holding a special debate in Parliament, among other things, reduced Dalit hesitation toward the BJP.
Social harmony events (Samajik Samarasata): RSS members visiting Dalit settlements and organizing community feasts, as well as working alongside local Dalit leaders, translated into votes at the grassroots level.
Anti-Muslim politics: In rural areas, the BJP brought its Hindutva politics—especially cow protection and law and order—to Dalit sections who felt they were being affected by Yadav dominance and Muslim influence.
4. "If Dalit votes are secured, victory; if not, defeat"
Why victory? Upper-caste votes alone (about 18-20%) will not be enough to make the BJP win. The reason the BJP achieved historic victories in the 2014 Lok Sabha election and the 2017 Assembly election was that it drew a significant share of Dalit votes that had traditionally gone to the BSP, especially non-Jatav votes, to its side.
When does defeat happen? The social coalition will break when the BJP presents itself as a “dominant caste party” or when it denies power-sharing to Dalits and backward communities. He explains, through the electoral history of Uttar Pradesh from 2004 to 2012, that when Dalit votes return to the BSP or the Samajwadi alliance, the BJP’s vote bank will collapse and it will face defeat.
In short: in Prashant Jha’s view, the BJP’s victory in Uttar Pradesh was not achieved merely because of a “Modi wave.” It was the result of the precise social engineering crafted by Amit Shah, bringing together upper castes + non-Yadav backward classes + non-Jatav Dalits. Whenever Dalit votes drift away from this coalition, the BJP’s victory comes into question.
5. Non-Yadav OBC consolidation: the foundation of the BJP’s formidable strength
OBCs make up about 40% to 45% of the state’s population. Among them, Yadavs (about 9-10%) are the Samajwadi Party’s solid vote bank. The remaining roughly 32% to 35% of voters belong to more than a hundred small and medium OBC castes such as Kurmi, Maurya/Sakya/Saini, Lodh, Nishad/Malla, Rajbhar, and Jat. The BJP brought them together as follows:
> Exploiting the anti-Yadav sentiment. Whenever the Samajwadi Party was in power, there was strong resentment among other backward castes that government jobs, police appointments, and local authority all went to Yadavs. The BJP advanced the campaign that "the Samajwadi Party is not a party for all backward communities; it is a party of one family (the Mulayam family), one caste (Yadav)." As a result, the smaller OBC castes, which had been sidelined without any share in power, began to see the BJP as their savior.

> Alliance with smaller caste parties (micro-alliance):
Apna Dal: Alliance with Anupriya Patel’s party for the influential 'Kurmi' votes in eastern U.P. (Purvanchal).
Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party (SBSP): Alliance with Om Prakash Rajbhar for the 'Rajbhar' votes in eastern U.P.
Nishad Party: Alliance with Sanjay Nishad for the votes of riverbank fishing and boatman communities.
Highlighting OBC faces:
Modi’s OBC identity: In the 2014 election, Narendra Modi presenting himself as someone from a 'backward community' (Teli/Kanji) had a major impact among grassroots OBC voters.
Keshav Prasad Maurya: Before the 2017 assembly election, Amit Shah appointed him, a non-Yadav OBC (Maurya), as the state president. He later made him deputy chief minister as well. This greatly increased the confidence of OBC communities.
Seat allocation: In the 2017 election, the BJP gave opportunities to non-Yadav OBC candidates in more than 130 constituencies where it contested.
Anti-Muslim sentiment and law and order. In rural areas, Yadavs and other backward castes who felt that Muslim dominance had put their land and security at risk found a sense of protection in the BJP’s hardline “law and order” stance and Hindutva politics. In particular, after the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, Prashant Jha points out that the Jat community of western Uttar Pradesh moved away from Muslims and turned fully toward the BJP.
In the 1990s, Kanshi Ram and Mayawati created a "Bahujan" (Dalits + backward classes + minorities) coalition and won using the same social-engineering strategy, which the BJP under Amit Shah reversed. A new "Hindu vote bank" of "forward castes + non-Yadav OBCs + non-Jatav Dalits" was built in that way. This is what made the BJP an unshakable force in Uttar Pradesh.
